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Highlights
On 10 May 2012, leading academics from the fields of economics, law, po-
litical science and history met, at the European University Institute, with 
the President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso 
and high-ranking officials to discuss the subject of ‘Democratic Govern-
ance of the Euro’. At the GGP High-Level Policy Seminar, policy recom-
mendations to strengthen democratic participation and legitimacy in the 
European Union in the context of the current crisis were debated., 
Amongst the participants, there was general consensus that more and 
deeper integration is needed to respond to the challenges posed by the 
Euro crisis. Building on this commonly shared view, the seminar debate 
turned on ways and models to reach such higher level of integration in a 
democratically legitimate manner. This Policy Brief highlights the follow-
ing five of the discussed options – non-exclusionary and interrelated in 
nature – to enhance democratic governance of the Euro:
(1) Politicizing the EU by politicizing the European Commission through 
the transformation of the next election to the European Parliament into 
an electoral competition on the presidency of the European Commission; 
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(2) Introducing a tax at the European level to equip the European Union 
with resources independent from Member States and to make citizens 
aware of the existing benefits of integration;
(3) Adding an institutional reform component to European policies, so 
that grant of European funds becomes conditional on targeted institutional 
reforms;
(4) Strengthening the relation between the European Union and national 
parliaments by furthering exchange and making European institutions 
more accountable towards national constituents;
(5) Increasing transparency and accountability of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM).
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I. Background
The fiscal crisis has exposed the most important 
element of the European Union’s democratic defi-
cit: the scope and level of politics has not followed 
the scope and level of political problems in Europe. 
Throughout the last decades, the European integra-
tion project has generated a deep interdependence 
between national policies; yet this interrelation has 
never translated itself into European politics. If one 
Member State adopts problematic fiscal policies, the 
impacts thereof will be felt in other Member States 
and although these issues are of a European dimen-
sion, they are in a good part still governed at the 
national level and still largely dependent on national 
politics. Hence, the Euro crisis serves as an exam-
ple of our incapacity to internalize the degree and 
democratic consequences of the interdependence 
generated by integration.
Moreover, the fiscal crisis has altered the reali-
ties of democratic governance and policy making 
within the European Union. Sixpack, Fiscal Com-
pact (TSCG) and European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), which were all introduced in reaction to the 
crisis, have contributed to this change. On the one 
hand, new institutions have been created in order 
to ensure fiscal stability. On the other hand, existing 
European institutions have taken on new responsi-
bilities. Exemplary for this development stands the 
introduction of the task for the European Commis-
sion and the Council of the European Union to re-
view national budgets (as stipulated in the Sixpack 
and Articles 5 et seq TSCG). Furthermore, some 
of these instruments have been decided upon out-
side the Community method and even the EU legal 
framework. Looking at the Fiscal Compact, as an 
example, it was adopted in the form of a classical 
international agreement.
From a democratic point of view, these changes 
share one problematic feature: They have been in-
troduced in such short time that democratic legiti-
mization thereof has not been able to keep up pace. 
This has contributed further to transform the crisis 
of the Euro into a crisis of the European Union. Two 
aspects highlight this development: first, intergov-
ernmentalism is on the rise. Far reaching decisions 
are taken by small political elites in late night con-
ferences without sufficient involvement of existing 
Union bodies and European citizens. Results are 
presented as being without any alternative and with-
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out an open political debate having taken place in 
the Union. Second, euro skepticism is on the rise. 
Many citizens do not see European institutions as 
reacting soundly to the crisis. Instead, they blame 
primarily the European Union for the current prob-
lems, although it has played an only minor role in 
their creation. 
Against this background, participants to the semi-
nar discussed what could be done to remedy the 
failures of the current system. Bearing in mind that 
a credible solution to the current crisis depends on 
addressing the democratic deficit of the European 
Union but also provides an opportunity to do so, 
they sought ways to create a constitutional moment 
within the existing Treaty framework that enables 
citizens to (re-)connect with the European Union.
II. Key Issues and Proposals
1. Politization of the European Commission
The first proposal argued that the next elections to 
the European Parliament should be transformed 
into an electoral competition on the presidency of 
the European Commission. According to the sug-
gestion, political groups in the European Parliament 
shall designate candidates for the next election on 
the post of President of the Commission. By doing 
so, the President of Commission would be equipped 
with more direct democratic support. The increase 
in power of the Commission under the new fiscal 
mechanisms would be met with an increase in the 
institution’s legitimacy. This would also serve to in-
crease the political capital of the President of the 
European Commission, granting him or her a more 
effective political authority to develop an agenda 
for the Union that would have been endorsed by 
citizens. To illustrate this point by means of a hypo-
thetical: had candidates for President of the Com-
mission discussed the options of Eurobonds or new 
own resources as a response to the fiscal crisis dur-
ing the last elections to the European Parliament, 
the Commission’s proposals on the issue would 
have enjoyed greater political capital. Furthermore, 
by making the election of President of the Commis-
sion dependent on the composition of the European 
Parliament, citizens would become more interested 
in its election, as well. They would no longer see 
their choices as being limited to being either for or 
against the Union as such. Instead, an emergent Eu-
ropean political debate would highlight to Europe-
an citizens alternative visions of what the European 
Union could look like in the future.
The suggestion raised critiques as to the feasibil-
ity and desirability of such politization. As regards 
the proposal’s feasibility, it is questionable whether 
candidates can be established in the absence of true 
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European parties. In addition, it is uncertain wheth-
er the Heads of government of the Member States, 
who currently propose the candidate for President 
of the Commission in the Council of the European 
Union, will accept such change in practice. With re-
gard to its desirability, there is the danger of over-
politizing and thereby weakening the Commission. 
The institution’s independence could be called into 
question. Furthermore, it is possible that after fu-
ture elections, the President of the Commission’s 
political orientation will not align with that of the 
parliamentary majority. Under such a constellation, 
ideological cleavages would have been created that 
would hinder instead of fostering cooperation.
In reaction to these objections, the proposal’s pro-
ponents replied that the benefits of such politization 
would nevertheless outweigh the risks linked to a 
lower perception of the Commission’s independ-
ence. The latter would, in any event, be put into 
question in light of its increased role in national 
economic and social policies and it’s better to as-
sume the consequences of this. As to the fact that 
the Traty on European Union (TEU) still entrusts 
the choice of President of the Commission to the 
Heads of government of the Member States, the pro-
posal proponents argue that the political dynamic 
and legitimacy generated by such electoral process, 
together with the fact that the President of the Com-
mission needs to be approved by Parliament, would 
give national governments no choice but to appoint 
the candidate having “won” the elections. In addi-
tion, they argued that this proposal will preserve 
some hybrid character of the Commission: a plural-
ist composition of the Commission and influence by 
Member States will be insured by the fact that Mem-
ber States continue to put forward candidates for the 
College of Commissioners. This should not be seen 
as a problem but as part of the gradual evolution of 
the EU political system.
2. No Representation without Taxation
The second proposal was to introduce a tax at the 
European level, if necessary under the method of 
enhanced cooperation. Two arguments were put 
forward in favour of the suggestion: first, a European 
tax will equip the Union with independent funds to 
supplement its surveillance policy of austerity meas-
ures with targeted supports and investments (al-
lowing it to act not only with a “stick” but also with 
“carrots”). Second, it will make the European Union 
more accountable: it would highlight the “European 
character” of the activities to be taxed at EU level 
and it would distribute ‘its’ money and not that of 
the States. The underlying democratic rationale is 
that of establishing a clear connection between the 
Union’s financial resources and the wealth it gener-
ates. European citizens will become more aware not 
only of the role of the European Union, but also of 
the benefits of integration. The solidarity discourse 
will also be altered: the Union would no longer be 
seen as transferring money from one State to an-
other, but distributing the wealth generated by the 
process of European integration.
As possible options for European taxation, partici-
pants to the debate mentioned in particular intro-
duction of a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) and 
reform of the VAT on cross-border economic activi-
ties. Concerning the FTT, they stressed that is essen-
tial to consider the objectives – creating a source of 
revenue, gaining political support, regulating banks 
– one wants to pursue when designing the tax. It was 
pointed out the difficulties in the construction of a 
FTT due the high mobility of capital. Nevertheless, 
many participants to the seminar perceived a FTT 
as a sensible option because the European Union 
could show that, due to its transnational nature, it is 
capable of regulating financial transactions more ef-
fectively than the Member States. Moreover, the tax 
was seen as having the potential to be strongly sup-
ported by European citizens. 
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Following up on this last point, taxation experts em-
phasized that, in the event of a European tax, politi-
cians will need to find a clear link between the cho-
sen form of taxation and its benefits.
3. ‘Power of the Purse’
Participants to the High-Level Policy Seminar put 
forward the idea to enhance reforms in the Member 
States not only through the threat of sanctions, but 
also via the means of positive incentives. The Euro-
pean Union should follow a ‘sticks and carrots’ ap-
proach. A first way to do so is making the grant of 
European funds conditional on targeted institution-
al reforms. Instead of giving money for projects of 
the Member States, the European Union should use 
its ‘power of the purse’ to only support projects and 
programmes that meet its (to be set up) substantive 
conditions (including systemic reforms). 
The alternative to allow Member States to spend on 
investment projects beyond the limits of the Fiscal 
Compact was also discussed. There was no consen-
sus in this respect. One suggestion was to allow such 
investments under the condition that they would be 
subject to a regime similar to the existing state aid 
regime.
Responding to the critique that such proposals add 
little to an increase of democratic legitimacy, its pro-
ponents on the one hand stated that one needs to 
evaluate the suggestions in comparison to the poli-
cies now in place, which give the Commission only 
the tool of sanctions to promote reforms. On the 
other hand, they pointed out two substantive argu-
ments: democracy requires a polity to offer some-
thing besides disciplining its constituents in order 
to gain acceptance; moreover, linking European Un-
ion policies and expenditures with systemic reforms 
in the Member States can result in the European 
Union playing a more effective role in remedying 
democratic failures at the national level.
4. Political Kooperationsverhältnis
The fourth option discussed to increase democratic 
governance within Europe was to establish a relation 
of stronger cooperation between European institu-
Leading scholars from legal, economic, historical and social backgrounds discuss proposals for the reform of the Euro area 
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tions, such as Commission and Parliament, and na-
tional parliaments. Given that the Commission has 
now the power to control national budgets,therefore 
a fundamental part of the work of national parlia-
ments, it is important to strengthen the direct dia-
logue amongst those actors. Fora of debate could be 
established to increase the sense of ownership by 
national parliaments as well as a sense of account-
ability by the Commission. For example, one could 
initiate debates within national parliaments under 
the label of ‘the state of the State in the Union’. In 
these debates, the President of the Commission or 
a European Commissioner would be required to 
present a summary of the reports, recommenda-
tions and assessments that the Union will produce 
for each State.
Furthermore, several participants stressed how im-
portant it would be for national politicians to change 
their conduct of externalizing political costs to the 
EU and internalizing the accomplishments and suc-
cesses of integration to their own advantage. It was 
thought that political debates, at national level, in-
volving both EU and national political actors may 
help remedying this situation.
5. Accountability and the ESM
Last, the debate turned to the specific design of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Highlight-
ing the key role it plays in reacting to the fiscal cri-
sis, it was argued that its accountability needs to be 
increased. Several of the proposals that the Policy 
Report “The Euro Crisis and the Democratic Gov-
ernance of the Euro” puts forward were briefly dis-
cussed. In particular, means to enhance the account-
ability of the Board of Governors of the ESM were 
suggested. Under the current framework, the Board 
of Governors itself is entrusted with the settlement 
of disputes arising on the interpretation and appli-
cation of the ESM Treaty between the ESM and one 
of its member states. Instead of having the Board act 
as a judex in causa propria, an independent Board of 
Appeal could be created as a surveillance body. Fur-
thermore, the ESM Treaty in its present form does 
not require the Board of Governors to state reasons 
for its decisions. Hence, a second suggestion was to 
create an obligation – similar to that of all EU insti-
tutions under Article 296 Treaty on the functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) – for the Board to 
motivate its decisions.
6. Conclusions
In the end, participants to the High-Level Policy 
Seminar agreed that realization of all or a combi-
nation of the discussed proposals will reduce the 
European Union’s democratic deficit and advance 
democratic governance of the Euro.
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